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Japanese Impact on Sumatra
At the time o f T ok yo' s su rren d er in August 1945 In don esia n n a t io n a l i s t s on Sumatra were i l l -p r e p a r e d , p o l i t i c a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y , to take ov er a d m in is tr a tio n from the d e p a rtin g Japanese.
During the o c c u p a tio n the is la n d had been governed by the Japanese 25th Army s e p a r a te ly from Java and o th e r p a r ts o f the In don esia n a r c h i p e l a g o .1 In a d d it io n , Japanese a d m in is tr a tio n in Sumatra was f a r more d e c e n t r a liz e d than th a t on Java. A lthough in A p r il 1943 the Japanese m ilit a r y a d m in is t r a t io n ' s head qu arters ( g u n s e ikanbu) which had a u t h o r it y ov er Sumatra was moved from Singapore to B u k it t in g g i, the ten s h u 2 o f Sumatra (co rr e sp o n d in g to the r e s id e n c y d iv is io n s under the Dutch) con tin u ed to be governed in p r a c t i c e , as la r g e ly autonomous u n its by t h e i r in d iv id u a l g ov ern ors ( o h o k a n ) . 3
The i n c l i n a t i o n o f the Japanese o c c u p a tio n f o r c e s throughout South e a st A sia towards such a d e c e n t r a liz e d form o f a d m in is tr a tio n was based on the id ea o f s e l f -s u f f i c i e n c y f o r each r e g io n .
In Sumatra t h is 1. For the fir s t year o f the occupation Sumatra was governed in conjunction with Malaya from the 25th Army Headquarters in Singapore. However, because of the differences in the character o f the regions and the economic importance o f Suma tra, in April 1943 the 25th Army moved to Sumatra, followed by the Department of the Chief Military Administrator. From this time on, there were separate depart ments for Malaya and Sumatra, but nevertheless for a considerable period ties be tween Sumatra and Malaya continued to be regarded as more important than those between Sumatra and Java. g en era l p o l i c y was stren g th en ed by the geography o f the is la n d , the p oor com m unications between the d i f f e r e n t a re a s , and the c h a r a c te r o f the Japanese a d m in istra to rs who were a p p oin ted t h e r e .4 However, the degree o f d e c e n t r a liz a t io n le d to c o n s id e r a b le h ardsh ip in p a rts o f Sumatra, p a r t i c u l a r l y the East Coast r e s id e n c y , which was cut o f f from i t s t r a d i t i o n a l so u rce s o f r i c e supply and was hard put to p ro v id e b a s ic n e c e s s i t i e s f o r i t s p o p u la tio n from i t s own r e s o u r c e s .5
The 25th Army on Sumatra was much more r e lu c t a n t than i t s c o u n te r p a rt on Java to a llo w In don esian s any r e a l r o le in c i v i l i a n or m ilit a r y a d m in is tr a tio n .
Only s lo w ly , p a r t i a l l y and w ith r e lu c ta n c e d id i t f o l low i n i t i a t i v e s launched by le a d e r s o f the Japanese 16th Army on Java towards g ra n tin g a g r e a te r d egree o f independence to the Indon esian n a t i o n a l i s e s . 6 In the e a r ly months o f the o ccu p a tio n the r e p r e s s iv e nature o f the Japanese a d m in is tr a tio n on Sumatra was p ro b a b ly a r e s u lt o f i n i t i a l pla n s which en v isa g ed in c lu d in g Malaya and Sumatra d i r e c t l y w ith in the Japanese e m p ir e ,7 because M Malaya and e s p e c i a l l y Sumatra" were seen as "th e c e n te r o f in d u s t r ia l developm ent in the Southern a r e a ." As "th e n u cle a r Zone o f the E m pire's plans f o r the Southern a rea " th ese t e r r i t o r i e s were to be t i g h t l y c o n t r o l le d and "a c lo s e r e la t io n s h ip o f mutual in terd ep en d en ce between [them] sh ou ld be f o s t e r e d and measures taken so as to p ro v id e f o r t h e ir i n t e g r a t i o n . " 8 In the l a t e r years o f the o ccu p a tio n u n w illin g n e s s to grant r e a l power to the Sumatrans would have been in c r e a s e d by fe a r s th a t the A l l i e s planned 4. For a discussion of the decentralized administration on Sumatra, see ib id . , p.
63; also pp. 281-82.
5. In Deli (East Sumatra) three-quarters o f the acreage o f land which in 1940 had been used for tobacco cultivation was switched to production o f food crops. Throughout Sumatra the Military Administration Department controlled the indus tries relating to defense, such as rubber, tin and iron, while they encouraged the Indonesians to rehabilitate factories that would contribute to the goal o f self-su fficien cy and increase the production o f basic food supplies. Nishijima, Japanese military Administration, pp. 273, 292.
6. Anthony Reid, "The Birth o f the Republic in Sumatra,M Indonesia, No. 12 (October 1971), p. 22.
7. Kanahele, !!Japanese Occupation," p. 57.
8. All these quotations are from "Instructions on the Administration o f Malaya and Sumatra (April 1942)," which is translated as Document 44 in Benda, Irikura, and Kishi (ed s.), Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), p. 169. By "indus tria l development" these instructions must have meant sources o f industrial materiel, as in 1942 there was l i t t l e industry on Sumatra. The record o f Japa nese negotiations with the Dutch during 1940-41 shows that o il was the most vital product needed by Japan after the United States had moved to limit exports there in July 1940. See H. J. van Mook, The Netherlands Indies and Japan (London: George Allen § Unwin, 1944), pp. 37, 51-63, 86. Two months before negotiations were broken o f f in July 1941, the Japanese were requesting up to 3,800,000 tons p.a. o f mineral o i l . Van Mook believed that with regard to rubber and tin Japan*s most c r itic a l needs had already been met by her control over Thailand and Indochina: "The two countries together produced 130,000 tons o f rubber annu a lly as against a Japanese consumption in past years o f 50,000 tons; her need for 10,000 tons o f tin per annum was exceeded by at least 50 per cent in the pro duction o f her new sphere o f influence." Ibid. , p. 77. See also Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 38-39, 265.
la n d in g s in Sumatra as the spearhead o f t h e ir c o u n te r -a t t a c k a g a in s t the J a p a n e s e .9 Thus, c e r t a i n l y u n t il 1945 th e re was l i t t l e m ention o f ev en tu a l in d ep en den ce, and the Japanese a c t i v e l y d isco u ra g e d any n a tio n a l i s t movements on the is la n d .
I t is a g a in st the background o f th ese f a c t o r s th a t one sh ou ld view such l a t e r Japanese statem ents on the backwardness o f the Sumatrans' p o l i t i c a l co n s cio u s n e s s as th a t o f G eneral Shimura:
The demand for independence was not nearly so strong as in Java. The opinion o f the Japanese Army o ffic ia ls in Sumatra was that the people o f that country were not su fficien tly developed, socia lly and culturally, to take on themselves the responsibilities o f self-gov ernment . 10
For a s h o r t p e r io d a f t e r they invaded Sumatra the Japanese had f o s t e r e d the hopes o f In don esian n a t i o n a l i s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the Is la m ic le a d e r s .
P r io r to t h e ir la n d in g s , a c c o r d in g to Benda, they had su p p ort ed the fo u n d a tio n o f Isla m ic a n ti-D u tch r e s is t a n c e groups both in A tje h and in West Sumatra which had prom oted the id e a th a t the coming o f the Japanese would le a d to I n d o n e s ia 's in d e p e n d e n ce .11 During the e a r ly months o f the o ccu p a tio n they had a ls o p e rm itte d Sukarno to e s t a b lis h a "Komite R a k ja t" in Padang which spread to o th e r p a rts o f West Sumatra12 and Chatib Suleiman to form h is "Pemuda Nippon R a j a . " 13 This freedom , how ever, a p p a ren tly la s t e d o n ly u n t i l they c o n s o lid a t e d t h e ir a u th o r ity on the is la n d , a f t e r which b oth o f th e se o r g a n iz a t io n s were d is s o lv e d 9. The number o f Japanese troops on Sumatra probably exceeded those on Java through much o f the occupation. Kanahele notes that on Java their military forces were reduced from 45-50,000 in March 1942 to about 10,000 by November o f that year, though in the last year o f the war they were again increased to 40-50,000 ("Japanese Occupation," pp. 65, 282). Before their invasion o f Sumatra the A llies estimated that there were 71,500 Japanese on Sumatra, though i t is un clear how many o f these were military men. See Rajendra Singh, Post-War Occupa tion Forces: Japan and South-East Asia (in the and the pemuda le a d e rs b r i e f l y a r r e s t e d .
The o r g a n iz a t io n s th a t were a llow ed to co n tin u e were e x p e cte d to eschew any p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . 1 lf In com parison w ith J ava, a d v is o ry groups o f Indon esians w ith in the l o c a l shu were la t e in b ein g e s t a b lis h e d , w ith the e x c e p tio n o f West Sumatra where ChSkan Yano s e t up a c o n s u lt a t iv e c o u n c il as e a r ly as J u ly 1942, w ith 15-20 members drawn from "a d a t , Is la m ic and n a t i o n a l i s t g ro u p s." i s Elsewhere in Sumatra th e se r e g io n a l a d v is o ry c o u n c ils (Shu S a n g i-k a i) were o n ly s e t up in November 1943, and no Sumatra-wide ce n t r a l a d v is o ry c o u n c il p a r a l l e l to th a t on Java was e s t a b lis h e d u n t i l 1 9 4 5 .1 4 1 5 16 Attem pts by Chatib Suleiman and Mohammad S j a f e i in J u ly 1943 to e s t a b lis h a r e g io n a l P u te ra , co rre sp o n d in g to the b a s ic o r g a n iz a t io n on J a va , were quashed by the Japanese a u t h o r i t i e s , 17 so th a t u n t i l 1945 In don esian p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the government was r e s t r i c t e d to the l o c a l a d v is o ry c o u n c ils .
There was a more ra p id developm ent o f the In don esian m ilit a r y f o r c e s on Sumatra than o f the c i v i l i a n o r g a n iz a t io n s , but they shared the same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . 18 The Heiho had been form ed v ery s h o r t ly a f t e r the a r r iv a l o f the Japanese in March 1942, and in November 1943, a month a f t e r e sta b lish m e n t o f the Peta on Java, i t s Sumatran e q u iv a le n t , the Gyugun (L a sjk a r R ak ja t) was fo r m e d . 19 Members o f the Gyugun were t r a in e d and q u a rte re d near t h e ir home d i s t r i c t s , and i n i t i a l l y the la r g e s t u n it was the p la t o o n .
L a te r, how e v e r , companies were o r g a n iz e d , some under In don esian commanders, and t h e ir was r e p o r t e d ly one b a t t a lio n in South Sumatra under a Japanese o f f i c e r . 20 A lthough a c c o r d in g to K anahele, the s i z e o f the Gyugun was sm a lle r than th a t o f the P e t a ,21 i t to o p ro v id e d t r a in in g f o r many o f 14. They included the Muhammadijah, Perti, the Madjelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (MTKAAM), and the Madjelis Islam Tinggi (MIT). Ibid. , p. 458.
15. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," p. 68. This council, a successor o f the Minang kabau Raad o f the Dutch period, apparently met regularly. It was formed and led by S ja fei, Sjech M. Djamil Djambek (representing the ulama) and Chatib Suleiman from the pemuda group. PST, p. 79. In the following March, a 56-member in s ti tute to study adat problems relating to regional administration was set up under the chairmanship o f Datuk Simaradjo (Balai Penjelidikan Masjarakat Minangkabau). Chokan Yano's sympathy toward ideas o f Indonesian independence led to his re moval from Sumatra in April 1944. See Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 148, 306.
16. Nishijima, Japanese Military Administration, p. 172.
17. Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation," pp. 86-87.
18. Apart from the small size and local nature o f the units, there were at least three training schools for the Gyugun, at Padang, Pagar Alam and Siborongborong (West, South, and East Sumatra the young o f f i c e r s who would le a d the independence s t r u g g le a f t e r the w a r .22 S e r v ic e A s s o c ia t io n s ( K o e n k a i ) were a ls o o rg a n iz e d to r a is e p op u la r su p p ort f o r th ese f o r c e s , but th ese to o e x is t e d on a p u re ly r e g io n a l b a s i s .
In West Sumatra the l o c a l Koenkai was headed by Chatib Suleiman and S j a f e i . 23
Thus, when the Japanese 25th Army f i n a l l y agreed in e a r ly 1945 to prom ote Sumatran n a t i o n a l i s t o r g a n iz a t io n s 24 th e re was an absence o f e a r l i e r groups on which to b u ild , and few Sumatrans had been c l o s e l y in v o lv e d in the b u rea u cra cy or a d m in is t r a t io n .25 On an u n o f f i c i a l b a s is the Japanese had r e c o g n iz e d the sta n d in g o f s e v e r a l Sumatran le a d e rs as t h e ir a d v is o r s :
Chatib Suleiman and S j a f e i in West Sumatra, A. K. Gani in Palembang, Hamka and A din egoro in East Sumatra, and Daud B eureuh,*N ja A r i f , and Mohammad A l i in A t j e h .26 These men, how ever, p la y e d no a c t iv e r o le in a d m in is t r a tio n , and t h e i r a d v is o ry p o s it io n s were r e s t r i c t e d to t h e ir own r e g io n .
The la ck o f a Sumatra-wide le a d e r s h ip o r in d ig en ou s a d m in is tr a tio n em bracing the whole is la n d had a c o n s id e r a b le b e a rin g on the way in which the independence s t r u g g le d e v elop ed in Sumatra.
The n a t i o n a l i s t movements on the is la n d grew in t o la r g e ly autonomous l o c a l o r g a n iz a t io n s and n ever a ch ie v e d the d egree o f c o o r d in a t io n n e ce s sa ry to b u ild up a u n if ie d Sumatran s t r u c t u r e .27
West Sumatra a f t e r the Independence P rocla m a tion
The su rren d er o f the Japanese on August 14 o c c u r r e d at a time when the P a n itia P ersiap an Kemerdekaan In don esiS (PPKI) [Committee f o r the P re p a ra tio n o f In don esian Independence] was g a th e rin g in D ja k a r ta ,28 the f i r s t o c c a s io n on which th ere had been d i r e c t Sumatran communica t io n w ith the n a t i o n a l i s t f o r c e s on Java s in c e the b eg in n in g o f the o c c u p a t io n .
The Japanese had a p p oin ted th re e d e le g a te s from Sumatra to t h is c o n f e r e n c e :29 Abdul Abbas, Dr. Mohammad Amir, and Teuku Mohammad H asan .30 The c h o ic e appears a stra n g e o n e , f o r alth ou gh re p r e s e n tin g th ree o f the main e t h n ic groups on the is la n d , the men were n ot as w id e ly known a s , f o r exam ple, Gani, S j a f e i and A d in e g o ro .
I t has been argued th a t they were p o s s ib ly n ot so com m itted to the id e a o f a Suma tran s t a t e as were some o f the o th e r le a d e r s fa v o re d by the 25th A rm y,31 but i t appears p ro b a b le th a t the o p p o s ite was in f a c t the c a s e ; and th a t th ese men were s tr o n g e r su p p o rte rs o f autonomy from Java than were S j a f e i , A d in e g o ro , Gani, who a l l had c lo s e t i e s w ith the n a t i o n a l i s t le a d e rs on J a v a .32 In the f i r s t s e s s io n o f the PPKI, Dr. Amir in p a r 27. With regard to relations with Java, however, the ban imposed by the 25th 32. Adran Kapau Gani, for example, in January 1946, was asserting that South Suma tra ' s lack o f leaders demanded a flood o f Javanese pemuda and military men to t i c u l a r was arguing f o r c o n s id e r a b le Sumatran autonom y.33 Over the o b je c t io n s o f H atta, the com m ittee d e cid e d th a t Sumatra as a whole would c o n s t it u t e a s in g le p r o v in c e , w ith i t s c a p it a l in Medan and w ith Hasan as i t s g o v e r n o r .3* * While th ese d e c is io n s were b e in g reach ed in D ja k a rta , how ever, in West Sumatra the pemuda were a lre a d y moving to take o v e r c o n t r o l from the o c c u p a tio n f o r c e s .
A lthough news o f the Japanese su rren d er d id n ot reach Medan u n t i l August 2 2 ,35 r e p o r t s o f the Independence P roclam a tion had rea ch ed Padang and B u k itt in g g i at l e a s t by August 1 8 . 36 I t is r e p o r te d th a t on th a t day Ism ael Lengah o rg a n iz e d a m eeting in Padang o f form er members o f the Heiho and Gyugun37 and by August 25 t h is group had form ed a B a la i Penerangan Pemuda In d o n e sia (BPPI) under h is le a d e r s h i p . 38 At about the same time the pemuda in B u k itt in g g i were a ls o h o ld in g m e e tin g s, and by August 25 had form ed t h e ir own o r g a n iz a t io n , the island. the Pemuda In d on esia ( P I ) , whose name a few weeks l a t e r was changed to Pemuda R epublik In d o n e sia ( P R I ) .39 4 0 4 1 4 2 4 3
Toward the end o f the month two o f the Sumatran d e le g a te s to the PPKI, Hasan and Dr. Amir, passed through B u k itt in g g i on t h e ir way from Palembang to Medan, and conveyed the in s t r u c t io n s o f the com m ittee r e g a rd in g fo rm a tio n o f a KNI (Komit6 N asion al I n d o n e s ia ), a d efen se f o r c e (Badan Keamanan R a k ja t, BKR) and the s t a t e PNI p a r ty . At a m eeting in Padang on A ugust*29, S j a f e i read the Independence P rocla m a tion and e x p re sse d the l o y a l t y o f the In don esian p e o p le on Sumatra to the SukarnoHatta l e a d e r s h i p .1 *0 The Hokokai in West Sumatra form ed i t s e l f in t o a KNI, w ith S j a f e i at i t s head, Dt. P e rp a tih B aringek and M. Djam il as h is d e p u t ie s , and S t. Mohd. R a s jid as t r e a s u r e r .1 *1 A lthough Sumatra was now o f f i c i a l l y u n if ie d as one p r o v in c e w ith in the R ep u b lic o f I n d o n e s ia , t h is f a c t had l i t t l e in flu e n c e on the co u rse o f even ts on the is la n d .
From the b e g in n in g the new Governor Hasan was handicapped in a ttem p tin g to a s s e r t le a d e r s h ip because he was r e l a t i v e l y unknown o u t s id e o f A tje h and Medan.1 *2 N e ith e r Palembang nor West Sumatra was l i k e l y to welcome a le a d from Medan, even i f i t co u ld be a s s e r t e d , as both r e g io n s f e l t they had b e t t e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to assume such a r o l e .
The f a c t th a t B u k itt in g g i had d u rin g the Japanese o ccu p a t io n been the o f f i c i a l c e n te r o f Sumatra c l e a r l y in flu e n c e d the a t t i tude o f the p e o p le in West Sumatra.
Throughout the r e v o lu t io n even ts in th a t r e g io n tended to be view ed in the c o n te x t o f th ose o c c u r r in g on Java ra th e r than o f th ose in o th e r p a rts o f Sumatra. The k in sh ip o f the Minangkabau w ith t h e ir r e p r e s e n t a t iv e in the D w itunggal, H a tta , was c l o s e r than w ith the Sumatran g o v e rn o r; and, o f c o u r s e , s e v e r a l o th e r Minangkabau were prom inent in the re p u b lic a n c e n t r a l le a d e r s h ip on Java.
The tendency to autonomous developm ent in West Sumatra was fu r t h e r in c re a s e d by the p a tte rn o f A l l i e d la n d in g s and Dutch pla n s f o r g a in in g c o n t r o l ov er the d i f f e r e n t p a r ts o f the is la n d .
As e a r ly as the end o f August sm all u n its o f Dutch o f f i c e r s were b e g in n in g to a r r iv e in Medan,1 *3 and from e a r ly O ctob er i t was the sp rin g b o a rd from which they hoped to r e e s t a b lis h t h e i r a u t h o r it y o v e r Sumatra. From O ctob er 9 , B r it is h f o r c e s , c h i e f l y the 26th Indian D i v i s i o n ,**** began la n d in g in Medan, Padang and Palembang, but they c o n c e n tr a te d on the more im portant s t r a t e g i c and econom ic areas round Medan and Palembang, a f t e r the end o f 1945 never c o n t r o l l i n g any t e r r i t o r y in West Sumatra beyond the boun d a r ie s o f P adang.1+5 Thus, from the b e g in n in g the c a p it a l o f the repub l ic a n government on Sumatra, Medan, was a ls o the c e n te r o f Dutch pow er, w h ile u n t il the end o f 1948 the r e p u b lic a n fo r c e s in West Sumatra were a b le to o rg a n iz e and run t h e ir own a d m in is t r a tio n , o n ly p e r ip h e r a lly a f f e c t e d by the Dutch f o r c e s around the p o r t c i t y o f P adang.1 *6
In b oth m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n m a tte rs, th e n , the s t r u g g le a g a in st the Dutch in West Sumatra was e s s e n t i a l l y a l o c a l on e, l i t t l e c o o r d i nated w ith a c t io n s in o th e r p a r ts o f the is la n d and on ly f i t f u l l y meshed in w ith the o v e r a ll pla n s b e in g form u la te d by the c e n t r a l g o v ernment on J ava. At the v ery o u t s e t , although the PPKI in D jak arta had sen t out o rd e rs f o r a KNI, a P N I,4 4 4 5 4 6 47 and a p a r a m ilita r y group to be form ed in a l l re g io n s o f In d o n e s ia , no s p e c i f i c in s t r u c t io n s were g iv e n , and i t was l e f t to the i n i t i a t i v e o f the l o c a l le a d e r s as to how such groups were to be s e t up.
As n oted a b ove, the KNI in West Sumatra was e s t a b lis h e d on August 31, but as w ith the o r g a n iz a t io n s during the Japanese p e r io d i t would be in a cc u ra te to assume th a t becau se the name and outward form o f the o r g a n iz a t io n p a r a l le le d th a t on J a va , i t s co n te n t and c h a r a c te r were a ls o s im ila r .
W hile the l o c a l KNI on Java were u s u a lly l i t t l e more than in West Sumatra the fu n c t io n in g o r g a n iz a t io n was the KNI i t s e l f , and i t was the movements both w ith in t h is body and in i t s in t e r a c t io n w ith o th e r groups in the r e g io n th a t shaped many o f the p o l i t i c a l d e v e lo p ments in West Sumatra during the f i r s t th re e y ea rs o f the r e v o lu t io n .
I t to o k lo n g e r to o rg a n iz e the m ilit a r y Badan Keamanan R akjat (BKR)48 than the c i v i l i a n KNI. The KNI to o k the f i r s t ste p s on Septem b er 2 towards s e t t in g up a BKR o r g a n iz a t io n at the d i s t r i c t l e v e l under c o n t r o l o f Ismael Lengah, but throughout th a t month the two pemuda groups in West Sumatra, the BPPI in Padang and the PRI in B u k it t in g g i, r e ta in e d t h e ir in d e p e n d e n ce ,49 w ith the PRI in p a r t ic u la r a ls o e s t a b lis h in g branches in the towns and v i l l a g e s o f the r e g io n .
Only when the A l l i e s began to land in Padang d id the two groups d e cid e th a t t h e ir members w ith m ilit a r y t r a in in g sh ou ld j o i n the o f f i c i a l TKR (T entara Keamanan R ak ja t) w h ile the rem ainder would a ct as b e r 25 when the B r it is h command ceded the T e ch n ica l S ch ool o f Simpang Haru in Padang to the NICA d e s p ite an e a r l i e r agreement th a t the Dutch would n ot be a llow ed to occu py any p a rt o f the c i t y w ith ou t the In d o n e s ia n s ' p e r m is s io n .5t* Pemuda f o r c e s alm ost im m ediately launched a tta ck s a g a in s t the s c h o o l com p lex, and in e a r ly December an E n g lish b rig a d e m ajor and a "la d y w ork er" were a s s a s s i n a t e d .5 4 55 A ft e r t h is o ccu rre n c e a s t r i c t c i v i l i a n cu rfew was im posed, and by the end o f the y ea r Padang was in a s t a t e o f c o n s id e r a b le t e n s io n , w ith Indian tro o p s from B u k ittin g g i b ein g brought in to stre n g th e n A l l i e d c o n t r o l ov er the to w n .56
Upheaval and R e o rg a n iz a tio n A d m in is tr a t iv e ly the p r o v in c e o f Sumatra was d iv id e d in t o r e s id e n c i e s , each w ith i t s l o c a l KNI. The f i r s t r e s id e n t o f West Sumatra, S j a f e i , was a p p oin ted on O ctob er 1 , and i n i t i a l l y he a ls o headed the r e s id e n c y KNI. At i t s t h ir d p le n a ry s e s s io n , h e ld in m id -O cto b e r, how e v e r , the KNI d e cid e d to se p a ra te the two p o s i t i o n s , w ith Dr. Djam il assuming the KNI l e a d e r s h i p .57 O f f i c i a l l y because o f i l l -h e a l t h S j a f e i was re p la c e d as r e s id e n t by Dt. P e rp a tih B aringek in the m iddle o f Novem ber.58 Under the new r e s id e n t th e re were m ajor p e rso n n e l changes at the demang Up to A p r il 1946 th ere appears to have been p r a c t i c a l l y no attem pt on the c i v i l i a n l e v e l by the c e n t r a l r e p u b lic a n le a d e r s h ip to a s s e r t c o n t r o l ov er developm ents on Sumatra. No r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s o f the ce n t r a l government v i s i t e d the is la n d u n t i l th a t month, and most o f the i n i t i a t i v e s e it h e r to f o llo w J a v a f s example o r to o rg a n iz e independent o r g a n iz a tio n s appear to have o r ig in a t e d from the Sumatran s i d e . 6 i
In the m ilit a r y f i e l d , how ever, attem pts to c o o r d in a te the Suma tran armed f o r c e s and t i e them in t o a TKR o r g a n iz a t io n 6 1 62 c o v e r in g both Java and Sumatra began b e fo r e the end o f 1945, and were to con tin u e throughout the r e v o lu t io n .
In e a r ly November, Dr. Gani was app oin ted the f i r s t c o o r d in a t o r o f the TKR on Sumatra, which was to c o n s is t o f a t o t a l o f s i x d i v i s i o n s .
A ft e r s e t t in g up a g e n e ra l headqu arters ( markets bes&r umurn) f o r the Sumatra command, Gani t r a n s fe r r e d a u th o r ity to Suhardjo H a rd jo w a rd o jo , a p p o in tin g him a m ajor g e n e r a l .63 In t h is i n i t i a l o r g a n iz a t io n D iv is io n s I and II were r e s p o n s ib le f o r South Sumatra (w ith t h e ir h ead qu arters at Lahat and P alem bang), D iv is io n I I I f o r C entral Sumatra ( B u k i t t i n g g i ) , D iv is io n IV f o r East Sumatra (M edan), D iv is io n V f o r A tje h (B ir e u e n ), and D iv is io n VI f o r T apanuli and Nias In a d d it io n , how ever, p a r a m ilita r y o r p e o p le ' s s e c u r it y f o r c e s were d e v e lo p in g o u ts id e o f the TKR s t r u c t u r e .
The e a r l i e s t o f th ese groups was made up o f the members o f the PRI o f B u k ittin g g i and Padang who con tin u ed t h e ir o r g a n iz a t io n at a l o c a l d efen se l e v e l . 68 The im p orta n ce o f the PRI d e c lin e d a f t e r the e sta b lish m e n t o f o th e r ir r e g u la r u n its d i r e c t l y t ie d to the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the Is la m ic o r g a n iz a t io n s , which began r e e s t a b lis h in g them selves from e a r ly Novem b er 1 9 4 5 .69 The two la r g e s t Isla m ic m ilit a r y o r g a n iz a t io n s were the H iz b u lla h , which was form ed at the in au gu ral m The f i r s t h a l f o f 1946 was marked by armed d istu rb a n ce s in East and North Sumatra, where u p r is in g s a g a in s t the l o c a l ra ja h s le d to co n s id e r a b le b lo o d sh e d and breakdown o f a u t h o r it y .
The v io le n c e spread as fa r as T a p a n u li,72 but in West Sumatra the main r e p e r c u s s io n s were in the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d .
The reasons f o r t h is d iv e rg e n ce are perhaps o b v i o u s, but are p ro b a b ly worth r e s t a t in g .
The two p r in c i p a l d if f e r e n c e s were t h a t , f i r s t , as has been n oted a b ov e, In don esian s in West Sumatra were under f a r le s s p re ssu re from the A l l i e d f o r c e s ; and the retu rn o f Dutch a d m in is tra to r s o u ts id e o f the immediate c o a s t a l e n cla v e o f Padang seemed much le s s im m inent.73 7 4 Thus, a lth ou g h th ere was c o n s id e r a b le d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n o v e r the European p re se n ce and the compromises w ith the Dutch b ein g made by the le a d e r s h ip o f the r e p u b lic , both on Sumatra and J ava, th e re was as y e t no sense o f s tro n g p re ssu re th a t demanded an immediate re sp o n se . More im portant at t h is sta g e was the d i f f e r e n t econom ic and s o c i a l environm ent in West Sumatra, where in d iv id u a l la r g es c a le landow nership was ra re and s o c i a l i n e q u a li t ie s le s s pronoun ced, and where th e re were few o b v io u s t a r g e ts on whom hungry and d is p la c e d p e o p le co u ld ven t t h e ir w r a t h .71* M oreover, in c o n t r a s t to East Sumatra the Minangkabau p o p u la tio n was e t h n ic a l ly homogeneous and the system o f s o c i a l o r g a n iz a t io n in West Sumatra tended to make i t e a s ie r f o r d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s to f in d channels through n o n v io le n t means. D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and p re ssu re f o r change were n e v e r th e le s s th ere but i t was w ith in the r e s id e n c y 's l e g i s l a t i v e b od y , the KNI Sumatera B arat, th a t moves were made to meet the demands. At i t s m eeting on March 14, 1946, the KNI s e t up a V o lk s f r o n t , m odeled on the Persatuan Perdjuangan form ed by Tan Malaka on Java in January o f th a t y e a r . 75 A lthough the f r o n t 's le a d e r s were m ostly drawn from the KNI i t s e l f , they were a l l from the more r a d ic a l com ponent, c o n s is t in g o f members o f the youth and la b o r g ro u p s, and s o c i a l i s t and communist p a r t i e s . 76 The o r g a n iz a t io n was d iv id e d in t o a s e r i e s o f c o u n c ils re p r e s e n tin g the d i f f e r e n t luhak (th e t r a d i t i o n a l Minangkabau d i v i s i o n s ) and d i s t r i c t s o f West Sumatra. C on trol o v er the "Fonds Kemerdekaan" and o v er the r e g i o n 's economy was t r a n s fe r r e d from the KNI to the V o lk s f r o n t . 77
In the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d , the V o lk s f r o n t 's a c t io n s were im m ediately marked by an in t r a n s ig e n t sta n ce toward the A l l i e d f o r c e s . Demands v o ic e d by the body on March 24 p a r a l l e l e d th ose b e in g is s u e d by fr o n t s in o th e r p a r ts o f In d o n e s ia , p a r t i c u l a r l y in East Sum atra,78 nam ely:
(1) th a t " a ll Dutchmen under p r o t e c t i o n o f the B r it is h sh ou ld be s u r ren d ered to the TRI; (2 ) a l l Indon esians a r r e s t e d by the B r it is h shou ld be su rren d ered to the r e p u b lic a n p o l i c e f o r c e ; (3 ) the B r it is h must r e q u est from the In don esian r e s id e n t in Padang any s u p p lie s they needed from West Sumatra; (4 ) the o f f i c e b u ild in g o f the r e s id e n t o f the R ep u b lic o f In d on esia in Padang sh ou ld be re tu rn e d by the B r i t i s h ; (5) the s a f e t y o f B r it is h s o l d i e r s and v e h ic l e s o u ts id e o f Padang co u ld no lo n g e r be gu a ra n teed ; and (6 ) the r e s id e n t sh ou ld is s u e an o rd e r th a t a l l a cco m p lice s and h e lp e r s o f the NICA be rem ov ed .79
The V o lk s f r o n t 's p r in c i p a l a c t io n s , how ever, were in the econom ic f i e l d , in a d r a s t ic attem pt to curb the i n f l a t i o n th a t was ra g in g in the r e g io n .
But the chaos r e s u lt in g from th ese ste p s le d the r e s id e n t to o v e r r id e t h e ir o rd e rs and d is s o lv e the fr o n t l i t t l e more than a month a f t e r i t had been e s t a b lis h e d .
The i n f l a t i o n in West Sumatra was b ein g e x a ce rb a te d by the number o f 100 rupiah Japanese n o te s which the Dutch were r e p o r t e d ly f lo o d in g in t o the a re a , and i t was around the problem o f t h is paper cu rre n cy th a t the V o lk s fr o n t c e n te r e d i t s a c t io n s . On A p r il 1 i t d e c la r e d th a t w ith in a month the 100 rupiah n ote would no lo n g e r be le g a l c u r r e n c y , and th a t b e fo r e the end o f th a t p e r io d a l l 100 rupiah n o te s sh ou ld be exchanged at the banks f o r n o te s o f sm a lle r d en om in ation s. As r e p u b lic a n cu rre n cy had not y e t been c i r c u l a t e d , t h is le d to an in s u p p o rta b le demand f o r the s m a lle r den om in ation al n o t e s , which the banks co u ld not m eet.
The s it u a t io n was fu r t h e r ag g ra v a ted by two o th e r f a c t o r s :
news o f the r e g u la t io n reach ed the towns b e fo r e the c o u n t r y s id e , so th a t many o f the unwanted n o te s g ot d e p o s ite d in ru r a l a re a s ; the r e g u la t io n a p p lie d o n ly to West Sumatra so th a t s p e c u la t o r s from o th e r a r e a s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the sou th ern p a rt o f T a p a n u li, c a p i t a l i z e d on the s i t u a t i o n .
This le d to a fu r t h e r reg u l a t i o n , banning a l l t r a f f i c w ith T a p a n u li, and a law by which no one co u ld p o sse ss more than 500 rupiah in c a s h .80
The immediate econom ic chaos r e s u lt in g from th ese measures le d the r e s id e n t to o v e r r u le the V o lk s fr o n t , is s u in g a r e g u la t io n as e a r ly as A p r il 5 th at the 100 rupiah n ote was s t i l l le g a l cu r re n cy .
C o n f lic t in g o rd e rs were is s u e d by the r e s id e n t and the fr o n t through most o f A p r i l, w ith the p o p u la tio n unsure which o f the two had le g a l a u t h o r i t y .81 F in a lly a f t e r a m eeting o f a l l the Sumatran r e s i d e n t s , a tten d ed by a d e le g a t io n from the c e n t r a l government in J o g ja , the le a d e rs o f the V o lk s fr o n t were a r r e s t e d on A p r il 2 4 .82
This se v e re a c t io n , how ever, appears to have had l i t t l e in the way o f r e p e r c u s s io n s , p o s s ib ly because o f the hom ogeneity between the le a d ers o f the V o lk s fr o n t and the KNI.
The s i x men were r e le a s e d a month l a t e r on May 22, were g iv en an o p p o rtu n ity to a ir t h e ir g rie v a n ce s b e f o r e the f u l l KNI, and were r e in c o r p o r a te d in t o i t s l e a d e r s h i p .83
The v a r ie g a te d d is tu rb a n ce s in the d i f f e r e n t p a rts o f Sumatra d id , how ever, have lo n g -te rm e f f e c t s on the a d m in is tr a tiv e o r g a n iz a t io n o f the is la n d , a le r t in g the p r o v in c ia l and c e n t r a l governments to the dangers o f the s it u a t io n t h e r e .
They le d to the f i r s t v i s i t by a ce n t r a l government d e le g a t io n to the is la n d 84 and to attem pts to r e s t r u c tu re the Sumatran a d m in is tra tio n in a way b e t t e r s u it e d to the r e a l i t i e s o f the l o c a l s it u a t io n on the is la n d .
These changes were made at a l l le v e l s from the p ro v in ce down to the n e g e r i.
In an attem pt to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e t i e s between Sumatra and Java, the c e n t r a l government d e le g a t io n oversaw esta b lish m e n t o f a Sumatran KNI, whose d e le g a te s would re p re s e n t the is la n d in the KNI Pusat on J a v a .85
At the p r o v in c e l e v e l a 100-member Dewan Perw akilan Sumatera was c r e a t e d , made up o f KNI r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s from each o f the r e s i d e n c i e s . 86 At the same time Governor Hasan, f i n a l l y r e c o g n iz in g the i m p o s s ib ilit y o f e f f e c t i v e l y a d m in iste rin g Sumatra as a s in g le u n it , agreed to the e sta b lish m e n t o f th ree s u b p r o v in c e s , N orth, C entral and South Sumatra, each w ith a deputy g o v e rn o r.
The su b p ro v in ce o f C en tral Sumatra i n c o r p o ra te d the r e s id e n c ie s o f West Sumatra, Djambi and R ia u .87 C rea tion o f the su b p rov in ce o f C en tral Sumatra le d to the fo u r th change o f r e s i dent in West Sumatra s in c e the Independence P ro cla m a tio n .
Dr. Djam il (who had re p la c e d P e rp a tih B aringek on March 18 when the l a t t e r was r e c a l l e d to Medan to take ov er an a d m in is tr a tiv e p o s t th e re ) was a p p oin ted deputy g ov ern or o f C en tral Sumatra, and h is p la c e as r e s id e n t o f West Sumatra was taken by Mr. S t. M. R a s jid on J u ly 2 0 .88 T ogeth er w ith th ese ch an ges, Dewan Pertahanan Daerah (R e g io n a l De fe n se C o u n cils) were cr e a te d in each o f the r e s i d e n c ie s .
These cou n c i l s complemented the Dewan Pertahanan Negara at the n a t io n a l l e v e l , and t h e ir aim was to c o n s o lid a t e the le a d e r s h ip o f the c i v i l a dm in is t r a t i o n , the army, and the M p e o p le M in t o a s in g le b od y .
In West Suma t r a the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah was headed by R esid en t R a s jid , w ith Army D iv is io n a l Plans f o r e s t a b lis h in g Dewan Perw akilan (R e p re s e n ta tiv e C o u n cils) at the n e g e r i le v e l were f i r s t put forw ard at the mid-March s e s s io n o f the KNI a f t e r the d e c is io n to form the V o lk s fr o n t .
The
Over the n ext y e a r , they were g ra d u a lly grouped in t o wilajah a u t o n o o m , and by November 1948, the o r i g i n a l 542 n e g e r i formed 21 autonomous n e g e r i b e s a r .93 9 4
There was a ls o a r e o r g a n iz a t io n o f the Sumatran m ilit a r y command 101. PST, pp. 133-34. According to Raliby (Documenta, p. 370), they were released on August 9 after several days* detention.
102. Nasution, TNI, I, p. 322. He states that the a irfie ld was pock-marked by fire from Indonesian arms, and that both it and the port could have been overrun had sia n a tta ck s were a p p a ren tly g e n e r a lly spontaneous and u n co o rd in a te d , b ein g launched la r g e ly by the non-TNI f o r c e s , w ith the e x c e p tio n o f one m ajor b a t t le in Padang at the end o f A ugust, le d by Dahlan D jam bek.103
In resp on se to the ta k
A re p u b lic a n p re se n ce was, how ever, m aintained in the town
M ajor disagreem ent a rose ov er the is s u e o f Dutch r e fu s a l to re tu rn In don esian p r is o n e r s , and ov er the In don esian in s is t e n c e on m a in tain in g a r e p u b lic a n town a d m in is tra tio n in Padang su p p orted by a s iz e a b le In don esian p o l i c e f o r c e to m aintain s e c u r i t y . 107 N e g o tia tio n s broke down o v e r th ese i s sues on December 31, and h o s t i l i t i e s were b r i e f l y resumed, but a g r e e ment was f i n a l l y reach ed in the m iddle o f January w ith the Dutch a c c e p tin g the p re se n ce o f 500 armed re p u b lic a n p o l i c e w ith in the town. From t h is p o in t r e la t io n s between the Dutch and the r e s id e n c y a dm in is t r a t i o n appear to have im proved, w ith many elem ents o f the government t o g e th e r w ith armed p o l i c e re tu rn in g from B u k itt in g g i to Padang by A p r i l . 108
However, th ere was e v id e n t d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n in West Sumatra w ith the l o c a l and n a t io n a l le a d e r s h ip and the compromises they were rea ch in g there been an organized attack by the combined lasjkar and TRI forces. w ith the Dutch. An atmosphere o f s u s p ic io n a p p a ren tly grew up in the e a r ly months o f 1947, w ith charges launched th a t le a d in g members o f the r e s id e n c y were a c tin g as anjing NICA.1^ At the b eg in n in g o f March w h ile a storm y KNIP was m eeting at Malang, w ith a number o f the West Sumatran le a d e rs p r e s e n t ,1 0 9 110 and was f i n a l l y a g re e in g to r a t i f y the L in g g a d ja ti Agreement, a group c a l l i n g i t s e l f the Pembanteras A nti Kemerdekaan In d on esia (PAKI) launched an attem pted coup in B u k it t in g g i.
This a c t io n , which became known as the March 3 A f f a i r , aimed at kidnapping the West Sumatra r e s id e n t and Banteng d i v i s i o n commander; but the a tta ck s on both t h e ir r e s id e n c e s were r e p e lle d by gu ard s. The PAKI d id , how ever, su cceed in kidnapping Eni Karim, A. G a ffa r Djambek and Anwar S t. S a i d i ,111 to g e th e r w ith s e v e r a l o th e r members o f the ad m in is t r a t io n and armed f o r c e s , and in the a tta ck s one government s o l d ie r was k i l l e d and one o f the a tta c k e r s wounded. The government r e a s s e r te d c o n t r o l the fo llo w in g day, fr e e in g the p r is o n e r s and a r r e s t ing the PAKI le a d e r s . P r in c ip a l among th ese were Saalah Jusu f S t. 
This a f f a i r r a is e d alarm p a r t i c u l a r l y amongst the Masjumi and army le a d e r s . I t may a ls o have r e in f o r c e d the d i s p o s i t i o n o f Sumatra le a d ers to f o llo w the i n i t i a t i v e launched on Java to b rin g m ilit a r y e l e ments o u t s id e o f the TNI in t o i t s o f f i c i a l s t r u c t u r e .113 1 1 4 E arly news rea ch in g the KNIP in
Malang on the in c id e n t re p o r te d th a t i t had been the West Sumatra Masjumi le a d e r s h ip which had i n i t i a t e d the cou p , so th a t N a ts ir im m ediately o rd e re d Masjumi le a d e r s Marzuki J a tim , A. R. S t. Mansur (head o f the H iz b u lla h ) and Udin back to B u k itt in g g i to i n v e s t i g a t e , a n d .h im s e lf le d a d e le g a t io n to the area on March 2 3 .111* D e s p ite , o r because o f , t h is con cern th e re seems to have been c o n s id e r a b le u n derstan d in g o f the m otives o f the PAKI, and because the i n v e s t i g a tio n dragged out in t o the summer the le a d e r s ' m isg iv in g s re g a rd in g L in g g a d ja ti appeared borne out by the f i r s t Dutch " p o l i c e a c t io n " launched on J u ly 21. When th ey were f i n a l l y se n te n ce d at the end o f A ugust, o n ly D t. Radjo Mangkuto was sen t to j a i l f o r a y e a r , w ith the o th e r r e c e iv in g e it h e r suspended se n te n ce s o r b ein g fr e e d d i r e c t l y . 115
Attem pts to U nify Sumatran R e s is t a n c e : 1947
Whatever impetus they r e c e iv e d from the March 3 A f f a i r , th ere were m ajor attem pts on Sumatra b eg in n in g in the sp rin g o f 1947 to e s t
a b lis h u n if ie d o r g a n iz a t io n s --b o t h m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n --w h i c h would i n c o r p o ra te the d is p a r a te groups and p a r t ie s th a t had p r o l i f e r a t e d s in c e the l a t t e r p a rt o f 1945.
I t appears c l e a r th a t the prime m issio n o f V ic e -P re sid e n t Hatta d u rin g h is exten ded sta y in Sumatra b e g in n in g in June o f th a t y e a r , was to u n ify the d iv e r s e a n ti-D u tch movements on the is la n d , and to b rin g the s t r u g g le in Sumatra as a whole in lin e w ith the p o l i c i e s o f the r e p u b lic a n government on Java. A lthough th ese u n i f i c a t i o n ste p s began during the s p r in g , i t was the f i r s t Dutch " p o l i c e a c t io n " o f J u ly 21 which p ro v id e d the needed stim u lu s f o r the l o c a l groups them selves to c o o p e ra te w ith the government and army le a d e r s h ip towards such an end.
In t h e i r a tta c k the Dutch em ployed sm a lle r f o r c e s on Sumatra than on J a v a ,116 and in West Sumatra i t was t h e ir B rigade U which moved out from Padang a tta c k in g a lon g the th re e main roads to the n o r th , e a s t and sou th o f the c i t y . 117 A ll th ese o p e r a tio n s were e it h e r n o ta b ly lim it e d 113. A decision had already been reached on November 26, 1946, between the Hizbullah and Sabilillah to unify their forces. PST, p. 560.
114. Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, pp. 338-39. They decided that the Masjumi leadership had not initiated the a ffa ir. N atsir's stated opinion o f the attempted coup was that it was a mixture o f good and bad. PST, p. 149.
115. Hamka was appointed to defend a ll the accused leaders. Their tria l was to have begun on July 17, but Hamka gained a postponement because the fasting month was to start on July 20. The defendants were on bail until their tria l at the end o f August. Hamka's account o f the a ffa ir is found in Kenang-kenangan, pp. T e rrito r y occupied by the Dutch a ft e r the f i r s t m ilita ry a ction (July 21, 1947).
T e rrito ry held by the Republic up to the second m ilita ry a ctio n (December 18, 1948).
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2 .
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10. The Dutch advanced fu r t h e s t on the n orth ern f r o n t , where they were i n i t i a l l y h a lt e d about f o r t y k ilo m e te rs from the c i t y and f i n a l l y r e t i r e d to e s t a b lis h p o s it io n s at Lubuk A lung, 23 k ilo m e t e r s n orth o f Padang. On the e a s te rn fr o n t they advanced o n ly as fa r as Indarung (r e t r e a t in g by the end o f the month to Padang's e a ste rn b o u n d a r ie s ), and to the south they were stop p ed s h o r t o f S igun tu r Tua, b oth towns w ith in f i f t e e n k ilo m e te rs o f Padang.* 118 I t i s p o s s ib le th a t the Dutch command d id not employ as la r g e a f o r c e in West Sumatra as i t d id in East and South, and th a t i t s aim th ere was m erely to se cu re c o n t r o l o v e r the Padang p l a i n . 119 The la c k o f econom ic p r i z e s , such as the p la n t a t io n area around Medan and the o i l f i e l d s near Palembang, th a t co u ld be gained by a w id er o ccu p a tio n would argue f o r t h i s .
C le a r ly , the geography o f the area p la y ed a r o l e in t h e ir lim it e d advance, w ith the Dutch f o r c e s b e in g h a lte d as soon as they approached the m ountains, t h is p ro b a b ly a cco u n tin g f o r the g r e a t e r e x te n t o f t h e ir p r o g r e s s to the n o r t h .120 Whatever the re a s o n s , the f a c t th a t a f t e r t h is a c t io n the Dutch o c c u p a tio n f o r c e s were s t i l l co n fin e d to an area o f about 15 k ilo m e te rs around the town o f Padang, and p a r t i c u l a r l y th a t a l l o th e r tow ns, n o ta b ly B u k it t in g g i, remained in re p u b lica n hands, must have had an e f f e c t on the a t t it u d e s o f the p e o p le o f West Sumatra.
These f e e l i n g s would have been a cce n tu a te d by the f a c t th a t the Dutch f o r c e s in North Sumatra had o ccu p ie d Pematang S ia n ta r , u n t il then c a p it a l o f the Sumatran a d m in is tr a tio n . This fo r c e d G over nor Hasan and h is c h i e f o f f i c i a l s to eva cu a te to B u k itt in g g i where they e s t a b lis h e d the Sumatran c a p it a l on August 6. With V ic e -P r e s id e n t H a tta 's p re se n ce th ere from ju s t a f t e r the Dutch a t t a c k , B u k itt in g g i came to be term ed, at le a s t among the Minangkabau, "th e secon d c a p i t a l " o f I n d o n e s ia . 121
An agreement had a p p a re n tly been reach ed between Sukarno and Hatta in the sp rin g o f 1947 whereby th e re was a s e p a r a tio n o f command, w ith Sukarno to le a d the s t r u g g le on Java and H atta th a t on Sumatra.122 From June 10 when he a r r iv e d in Medan H atta had been e x h o r tin g Sumatran le a d e rs on the need f o r u n ity in t h e ir common s t r u g g le a g a in st the Dutch, and im m ediately a f t e r the Dutch a tta c k he encouraged fo rm a tion o f a Front Pertahanan N asion al (n a t io n a l D efense F r o n t ), in c o r p o r a t in g the d iv e r s e m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n o r g a n iz a t io n s on the is la n d . This body was to work c l o s e l y w ith the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah e s t a b lis h e d a y ea r p r e v io u s ly .
Both c i v i l i a n and m ilit a r y le a d e r s were p re se n t at a m eeting in B u k itt in g g i on J u ly 29 in which a t o t a l o f 56 groups agreed to j o i n t o g e th e r in t o the f r o n t under the le a d e r s h ip o f ' Hamka, and w ith Chatib Suleiman as s e c r e t a r y . 123 1 2 4 This fr o n t was to s e t up a l o c a l d efen se o r g a n iz a t io n w ith BPNK (B arisan Pengawal N egeri dan Kota) which was to m o b iliz e a l l young men between the ages o f sev en teen and t h i r t y -f i y e . 12lf
At the same time moves were underway to implement the P r e s id e n t 's May 5 o rd e r th a t a l l la s jk a r groups sh ou ld be in c o r p o r a te d in t o the TN I.125 The f i r s t ste p toward th a t o b j e c t i v e was the c r e a t io n on J u ly 1 o f a Dewan K ela sjk a ra n Sumatera Tengah under C o l. S j a r i f Usman.126 In August the la s jk a r groups were c o n s o lid a t e d in t o a Legiun S ja h id , again under S j a r i f Usman.127 The fo llo w in g month Hatta named the H iz b u lla h commander, A. R. S t. Mansur, as t i t u l a r m ajor g e n e ra l in charge o f step s to in c o r p o r a t e t h is f o r c e in t o the TNI, and in November i t s name was changed to TNI Resimen Istim ewa Komandemen Sumatera, t h is regim ent b e in g fu se d in to D iv is io n IX Banteng on February 2 o f 1 9 4 8 .128 These m oves, how ever, r a is e d resentm ent among the la s jk a r f o r c e s , many o f whom sen t demands and re q u e sts f o r a degree o f autonomy to the Sumatran panglim a. A ft e r d is c u s s io n s w ith D iv is io n IX, they were a llo w e d to form th ree b a t t a l i o n s , but n ot t h e ir own regim ent w ith in the d i v i s i o n . P a r t ic u l a r ly d i f f i c u l t f o r the la s jk a r groups to a cce p t was the r e p la c e 
ment o f most o f t h e ir o f f i c e r s by TNI commanders from the Banteng d i v i s io n . 129
A ft e r t h is in c o r p o r a t io n the Banteng d i v i s i o n c o n s is t e d o f s ix reg im en ts, f o r in August Hasan B a s r i! s Regiment IV in Riau had been r e o rg a n ize d in t o two re g im e n ts.
B asri con tin u ed to command Regiment IV and Regiment V was under M ajor Toha H a n a fi.
The new Regiment VI was commanded by Major Kemal M ustafa, and i t a s s is t e d Regiment I on the n orth ern f r o n t . 130
Whatever chance e x is t e d o f an a ctu a l in t e g r a t io n o f the m ilit a r y and p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s on Sumatra d isa p p ea red in e a r ly 1948.
By th a t time the TNIf s heavy-handed approach had a lre a d y a lie n a t e d many o f the la s jk a r g ro u p s .
But i t was the R e n v ille Agreement and the d ep a rtu re o f Hatta to Java, 131 which le d to the fra g m en ta tion o f the FPN. The Ren v i l l e Agreement again brought to the s u r fa c e the d is s e n s io n between many o f the FPN's component groups w ith rega rd to the path b e in g p u r sued by the c e n t r a l governm ent, and during the f i r s t months o f 1948 the o r g a n iz a t io n was no lo n g e r p re te n d in g to the fu n c t io n o f u n ify in g the s tr u g g le in West Sumatra. The in d iv id u a l p a r t ie s in c re a s e d in s tr e n g t h , drawing away many o f the le a d e rs from a body which no lo n g e r r e p r e sen ted t h e ir v ie w s . 133. Ib id ., p. 579. According to Nasution, there were reports from the Sumatra com mand o f former lasjkar groups in West Sumatra, Tapanuli, and Atjeh attacking and disarming TNI units in these regions. Nasution, TNI, II, p. 235.
R a t io n a liz a t io n and D e c e n t r a liz a t io n
The R e n v ille Agreem ent, apart from the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i t caused the c e n t r a l r e p u b lic a n le a d e r s h ip , d id not have as g re a t an impact on Sumatra as i t d id on Java. Dutch a u t h o r it y remained lim it e d to an area o f o n ly about o n e -f i f t h o f the is la n d , c o n t r o l b ein g most e x te n s iv e on the e a st and so u th e a ste rn c o a s t s , w ith o n ly a p o ck e t around Padang.134 Thus, at le a s t in West Sumatra, th ere was no need f o r any s u b s t a n t ia l w ithdraw al o f In don esian tro o p s from the D u tch -o ccu p ie d t e r r i t o r y . 135
On ta k in g o v e r c o n t r o l o f the c e n t r a l governm ent, H atta in a u g u ra t ed a b a s ic r e o r g a n iz a t io n o f b oth m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n a f f a i r s aimed at a ch ie v in g g r e a t e r coh eren ce o f the re p u b lic a n f o r c e s in the more lim it e d areas they now c o n t r o l l e d .
He attem pted to ca rry out p o l i c i e s o f r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and r e c o n s t r u c t io n o f the armed f o r c e s , and d ecen t r a l i z a t i o n o f the c i v i l i a n a d m in is tr a tiv e o r g a n iz a t io n .
In the m ilit a r y f i e l d , the aim o f r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n was to stream lin e the army s t r u c tu r e by m assive d e m o b iliz a t io n , and to c r e a te '" m o b ile o f f e n s i v e sy stem s' o f s h i f t i n g p o c k e t s " o f h ig h ly t r a in e d , more f u l l y armed r e g u la r f o r c e s , su p p orted by t e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t i a s . 136 In Sumatra N asution en v isa g ed fo u r s u b t e r r i t o r i e s (co rr e s p o n d in g to the fo u r p r o je c t e d autonomous a d m in is tr a tiv e r e g i o n s ) , South Sumatra, Cen t r a l Sumatra, T a p a n u li-E ast Sumatra, and A tje h .
Each o f th ese s u b t e r r i t o r i e s would have an in fa n t r y b rig a d e made up o f s e v e r a l m obile b a t t a l io n s , and t e r r i t o r i a l u n its d is t r ib u t e d amongst the kabupaten. 137
To convey th ese i n s t r u c t i o n s , N asution accom panied H atta to West Sumatra in A p r il 1948.
T h e ir p lan s were c o l d l y r e c e iv e d by the Suma tra n panglim a, w ith Major G eneral Suhardjo s t a t in g th a t the commanders who had been f ig h t in g in t h e ir own r e g io n s would not be w i l l i n g to be moved nor t h e ir u n its to be r e o r g a n iz e d .
The army in Sumatra, he s t a t e d , was e s s e n t i a l l y an army dependent on the l o c a l p o p u la t io n , and in th ose circu m sta n ces the government on Java was in no p o s i t i o n to impose i t s w is h e s .138 * I t was thus n ot u n t i l November when C o lo n e l H id a ja t was sen t to r e p la c e M ajor G eneral Suhardjo as PTTS (Panglim a Tentara dan T e rrito r iu m Sumatera) th a t any e f f o r t was made to implement the r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o rd e rs f o r Sum atra.133 I t was p o s s ib ly because o f t h is d ela y th a t th e re appear to have been no ech oes o f the Madiun r e b e l l i o n in West Sum atra.140 Im m ediately a f t e r the r e b e l l i o n Sumatran 140. There was clearly suspicion that the armed clashes between TNI and lasjkar branches o f the PKI met w ith the g ov ern or to s t a t e t h e ir firm su p p ort o f the re p u b lica n govern m en t.141 S h o rtly a f t e r Suhardjo was t r a n s fe r r e 
Sumatra and T a p a n u li), and South Sumatra (in c o r p o r a t in g Bengkulen, Palembang, Lampung, and B a n g k a -B e litu n g ),14^ The deputy forces in Tapanuli were tied in with the Madiun rebellion. The clashes were between Tapanuli TNI units and regular and lasjkar forces withdrawn from East Sumatra. In a further v is it to the area at the beginning o f December Hatta helped bring the clashes to an end, and Kawilarang took over command there, with Ibrahim Adjie as his deputy. The southern part o f East Sumatra and Tapa nuli became Subterritory VII. See "Pengalaman Gerilja di Sumatera (Tapanuli Utura)" in Madjalah Sedjarah M iliter Angkatan Darat, No. 22 (1965), pp. 14-19.
141. Suripno and Musso had stopped over for two days in Bukittinggi on their way to Java. Although the two held meetings in Bukittinggi, the identity o f Musso does not seem to have been revealed until after he arrived in Java. PST, p. 166. 
In April
e n t r a l g ov ern ment l a w ) . 150 * U n til new e l e c t i o n s co u ld be h e ld , the DPR f o r the stated: ffln the two years after the proclamation the Central Government seemed to neglect Sumatra and many powers were given to the Governor, so that he be came the so-called small President (his position is considered higher than that o f a m inister). However in practice the Governor o f Sumatra is only the Gover 
From B u k itt in g g i they launched o f f e n s iv e s a g a in st the re p u b lic a n f o r c e s which f i n a l l y s e t up t h e ir n orth ern fr o n t subcommand at Matur.
To the e a s t , the Dutch co o r d in a te d in fa n t r y a tta ck s w ith an amphibious la n d in g on Lake Singkarak from where they advanced to occupy S olok on December 20. To the south they moved more s lo w ly , lau n ch in g t h e ir main a s s a u lt on January 6 a f t e r la n d in g tro o p s at Painan.
Throughout the sp rin g they extended t h e ir c o n t r o l , making fu r t h e r la n d in g s down the c o a s t and advancing in t o the i n t e r i o r . 153
By e a r ly 1949 they had o c c u p ie d most o f the towns and m ajor v i l la g e s o f West Sumatra, and from th ese o u tp o s ts d isp a tch e d u n its to p a t r o l the surrounding c o u n tr y s id e and a tta c k s u s p e ct v i l l a g e s .
During the Dutch advance the r e p u b lic a n f o r c e s appear to have put up l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e , in g e n e ra l e v a cu a tin g the towns as the Dutch approached, and r e t r e a t in g , sometimes in d is o r d e r , to more d e f e n s ib le p o s it io n s c h i e f l y in the f o o t h i l l s and on the mountain s lo p e s .
The shock o f the Dutch a t t a c k , p a r t i c u l a r l y the bombing o f B u k it t in g g i and o th e r tow ns, seems to have thrown the In don esian s in t o com p le t e d is o r d e r .
A group from the c e n t r a l governm ent, in c lu d in g the R epu blican M in is te r o f Economic A f f a i r s , S ja f r id d in P raw iranegara, was ga th ered in B u k ittin g g i from December 18 to g e th e r w ith l o c a l m ilit a r y and c i v i l i a n le a d e r s , a w a itin g the a r r iv a l o f Su karno's pla n e which was sch ed u led to sto p o v er th e re on i t s way to In d ia . 15** P anic seems to have been w idespread as news a 154. PST, p. 169; Hamka, Kenang-kenangan, p. 403. Hamka writes that when they heard the sound o f a plane they thought i t was carrying Sukarno, only to discover that it was the beginning o f the Dutch attack.
155. Ibid. , pp. 403-404. The Propinsi states that before withdrawing from Bukit tinggi, the Banteng division issued a bulletin that the presidential party had arrived safely in India, "which even though i t was not true, had a great in flu ence in dispelling the panic caused by the Dutch broadcasts concerning the arrests o f Sukamo-Hatta." PST, p. 169. s e t up and le a d a Pemerintah Darurat R epu blik In d on esia (P D R I)156 which was p rocla im e d on December 22 a f t e r o f f i c i a l news was r e c e iv e d o f the a r r e s t s on Java. By t h is time members o f the Emergency Government had eva cu a ted to a M p la c e in S u m a tra ."157 S h o r tly b e fo r e the a r r iv a l o f the Dutch fo r c e s the West Sumatran le a d e r s h ip had a ls o r e t i r e d to e s t a b lis h them selves in K o t o t in g g i. 158
The 161. According to Hamka, Djambek destroyed the radio station before he le f t , and later personally led attacks on Dutch forces in Bukittinggi from his positions just outside the city . Ibid. , pp. 420, 428-29.
A ft e r the i n i t i a l trauma o f the r e t r e a t when com m unications were broken between most o f the armed u n it s , the command s tr u c tu r e was s lo w ly b u i l t up, but i t was now e s s e n t i a l l y both f l e Under the c e n t r a l command th e re were th ree subcommands, co rre sp o n d in g to the e a r l i e r n o r th , e a s t and south f r o n t s , but w ith t h e ir h ea d qu a rters u s u a lly fa r in t o the m o u n ta in s .162
The le a d e r s h ip o f West Sumatra su s ta in e d se v e re blows during the e a r ly p a rt o f 1949. A few days a f t e r they had s e t up t h e ir headquar t e r s in K o t o t in g g i, the Dutch ov erra n the v i l l a g e on January 1 0, i n f l i c t i n g , c o n s id e r a b le damage though n ot fin d in g the tr a n s m itte r by which R a s jid m aintained c o n t a c t w ith the S ja fr u d d in g ov ern m en t.163 More d is a s t r o u s was the in c id e n t at S itu d ju h B atur, where a m eeting had been arranged f o r January 14 between many o f the top West Sumatra le a d e r s to attem pt to work out a s t r a t e g y f o r c o n fr o n t in g the d r a s t i c a l l y changed s it u a t io n in the r e g io n . Many o f the p a r t ic ip a n t s had t r a v e le d lon g d is ta n c e s on f o o t to reach the sm all v i l l a g e at the f o o t o f Mt. S igu n g, about tw elve k ilo m e te rs from the Dutch o u tp o s t at the town o f Pajakumbuh.
The Dutch, how ever, had o b ta in e d i n t e l l i g e n c e o f the m eetin g , and they a tta ck e d the v i l l a g e b e fo r e dawn on the 1 5 th , k i l l i n g 49 o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s , in c lu d in g Chatib S u le im a n .164 Power was to be t r a n s fe r r e d to the re s id e n c y l e v e l , where the Dewan Pertahanan Daerah (DPD) was g iv en f u l l a u t h o r it y to le a d the m ilit a r y and c i v i l a d m in is tr a tio n .
The cu rre n t C en tral Sumatra g o v e rn o r, Nasrun, was to 162. Subcommand A (formerly Regiments I and VI) which covered the northern front and which had retreated to Matur, was commanded by Lt. The r e s id e n t was to head the DPD w ith h is deputy to be a p p oin ted by the m ilit a r y commander o f the r e g io n .
Thus in West Sumatra, S. Mohd. R a s jid headed the DPD, w ith Dahlan Ibrahim as h is i n i t i a l d e p u ty .166 On January 2, 1949, each r e s id e n c y became a m ilit a r y r e g io n , w ith the r e s id e n t now a p p oin ted i t s m ilit a r y g o v e r n o r .167 I t was s t r e s s e d th a t t h is move was an emergency m easure, and most o f the b u p a ti and low er o f f i c i a l s r e ta in e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , though they were now c la s s e d as " m ilit a r y b u p a t i . " 168
At the b e g in n in g o f May th e re was a fu r t h e r r e o r g a n iz a t io n whereby West Sumatra and Riau were again jo in e d in t o the p r o v in c e o f C en tra l Sumatra, w ith R a s jid as i t s m ilit a r y g o v e r n o r ,169 * w h ile the r e s id e n c y o f Djambi came under the a u th o r ity o f the South Sumatra m ilit a r y g o v e r n o r .170 This arrangement co n tin u e d u n t i l the b e g in n in g o f the f o llo w in g y e a r , when a f t e r the t r a n s f e r o f s o v e r e ig n t y the p r o v in c e o f C en tral Sumatra (now a ls o to in c lu d e Djambi and the Riau a r c h ip e la g o ) was r e a c t iv a t e d under a c i v i l i a n govern m en t.171 When S. Mohd. R a s jid was t r a n s fe r r e d to the L oca l J o in t Committee in O ctob er o f 1949, h is p la c e as m ilit a r y g ov ern or was taken by Mr. Nasrun, who r e t a in e d the p o s i t i o n o f g ov ern or a f t e r the t r a n s fe r o f s o v e r e i g n t y .172 ifc * jfe
In the e a r ly p a rt o f 1949, having o c c u p ie d a l l the m ajor towns o f West Sumatra, the Dutch made moves towards c r e a t in g a "Negara MinangkabauM which they hoped would become one o f the fe d e r a te d s t a t e s o u ts id e o f the r e p u b lic .
As e a r ly as December, ju s t a f t e r they launched t h e ir a t t a c k , they had se n t c o n t a c t s to S j a f e i , then in h id in g in Padang Lawas, i n v it in g him to le a d the p r o je c t e d s t a t e . 173 He r e fu s e d .
Any e a r l i e r attem pts to d eta ch elem ents in West Sumatra from the r e p u b lic had been lim it e d by the f a c t th a t Dutch c o n t r o l exten ded o n ly to the immediate area around Padang. N e v e rth e le ss in 1946 they had c r e a te d in the town a p o l i t i c a l o r g a n iz a t io n , the Persatuan Umum, w ith 165. PST, p. 170.
166. Ibid. , p. 172. In the West Sumatra DPD the members from the executive were Dr.
Ali Akbar and Orangkajo Ganto Suaro, and from the peoples* organizations, Ab dullah, Bachtaruddin, and Hadji Siradjuddin Abbas. a m ilit a r y arm, the S e rik a t K u tjin g H ita m .174 In 1947 the Persatuan Umum form ed i t s e l f in t o a Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Barat (DISBA) in Padang,175 * and a f t e r the secon d Dutch m ilit a r y a c t io n branches o f t h is o r g a n iz a t io n were s e t up in o th e r tow ns, such as Padang Pandjang and B u k it t in g g i, under the name B a la i Permusjawaratan Sementara (B P S ).175
From th ese o r g a n iz a t io n s grew a movement, weak and s h o r t -l i v e d , to c r e a t e a Negara Minangkabau (Minangkabau S ta te ) as p a rt o f the impend ing F ed eral R e p u b lic o f In d o n e sia .
The f i r s t ste p was the e s t a b l i s h ment on March 20, 1949, o f a "com m ittee to determ in e the s ta tu s o f the Minangkabau" which a d v oca ted s e p a r a tio n from the r e p u b lic so th a t West Sumatra would become one o f the fe d e r a te d s t a t e s . 177 B r ie f ly i t a t t r a c t ed to i t s s id e the form er r e s i d e n t , Dt. P e rp a tih B arin gek , who to g e th e r w ith Mr.<Harun A. R a s jid , b ro a d c a s t the view th a t c o n t in u a tio n o f the s t r u g g le would o n ly fu r t h e r hurt the p e o p le o f West Sumatra, and th a t in o rd e r to a ch ie v e independence i t was n e ce s sa ry to co o p e ra te w ith the D u tch .178 B aringek a ls o o rg a n iz e d a m eeting in la t e A p r il to "re a ch com plete u n ity to fa c e the cu r re n t s it u a t io n in the M inangkabau," at which speakers from DISBA were prom in en t. At t h is m eeting he d is cla im e d any am bition to head a "Negara M in an gk abau ."179
The re p u b lic a n le a d e rs in West Sumatra com batted the movement by sending l e t t e r s to Bangka and D ja k a rta , s t a t in g th a t the v o ic e s o f the DISBA d id not re p re s e n t the Minangkabau p e o p le , and demanding th a t e l e c t i o n s be h e ld in th o se p a r ts o f West Sumatra under Dutch c o n t r o l . 180 By June P e rp a tih B aringek had d is ta n c e d h im s e lf from the DISBA, not appearing at a m eeting i t h e ld in Padang, and sen din g a l e t t e r s t a t in g th a t the movement was sowing 182. PST, p. 232.
From then u n t il the t r a n s fe r o f s o v e r e ig n ty at the end o f 1949 on ly the area im m ediately su rrou n din g the town o f Padang s t i l l remained as a daerah istimewa.l8i In December the r e s id e n t o f Padang su rren d ered h is a u th o r ity to the g ov ern or o f C en tral Sumatra. The c e n t r a l r e p u b lic a n governm ent, p a r t ic u l a r l y a f t e r fo rm a tio n o f the u n ita ry s t a t e in August 1950, appeared no lo n g e r w i l l i n g to a llo w any r e a l measure o f l o c a l autonomy such as had been g ran ted most e x p l i c i t l y in Law No. 22 o f 1948.
In c o n t r a s t , d e c e n t r a liz a t io n o f a u th o r ity had been an assum ption b a s ic to the co n tinuum o f p o l i t i c a l developm ents in West Sumatra d u rin g the r e v o lu t io n , where th ere had grown up a c l e a r e x p e c ta t io n th a t the r e g io n would be la r g e ly autonomous in co n d u ctin g i t s in t e r n a l a f f a i r s under an o v e r a ll c e n t r a l a d m in is tr a tio n . These co n tra ry views found e x p r e s s io n in a fundam ental c o n f l i c t between the DPRST (w ith i t s e x e c u t iv e b od y , the Dewan Pem erintah Daerah [DPD] ) and the c e n t r a l government which was con d u cted throughout 1950. The d isp u te fo cu s e d on the is s u e o f the degree o f power p o s s e s s e d by the r e g io n a l a u th o r ity w ith rega rd to appointm ent o f the govern or
(kepala daerah).
In A p r i l , the DPR demanded the rem oval o f Governor Nasrun, and subm itted names o f i t s own nominees f o r h is r e p la c e m e n t.187
183. There were also daerah istimewa in Riau (particularly the islands) and Djambi.
Ibid . , pp. 302-3. 187. It is unclear why the DPR wanted Nasrun's removal, the only reason given being that he had lost the confidence o f the people o f West Sumatra. The demand was While h is p o s i t i o n was b ein g debated Nasrun took a m onth's le a v e from o f f i c e , w ith the DPD a s s e r t in g i t s r ig h t to assume h is d u tie s in the in t e r i m .* 188 A ft e r c o n s id e r a b le d e la y , the Hatta government f i n a l l y agreed to N asrun's rem oval, r e c a l l i n g him to D jak arta on August 1 , 1 9 5 0 .189
With h is d e p a rtu re , the c o n f l i c t s h i f t e d to the s e l e c t i o n o f h is re p la ce m e n t.190 A d e c is io n on t h is was i n i t i a l l y d ela yed by a change o f government in ,D ja k a r ta , w ith N a ts ir r e p la c in g Hatta as prime m in is te r o f the new u n ita r y governm ent.
The I n t e r i o r M in is t e r , Mr. A ssa a t, him s e l f a Minangkabau, v i s i t e d C en tral Sumatra on September 29 to attem pt to rea ch an agreem ent, w h ile Deputy G overn or, S. J . Sutan Mangkuto, a cte d as p r o v is io n a l head o f the p r o v in c e .
A pp aren tly unable to come to a compromise w ith the r e g io n a l a d m in is t r a tio n , the I n t e r i o r M in istry on November 9 a p p oin ted Ruslan M u ljoh a rd jo as a c t in g g o v e rn o r, ig n o rin g the names put forw ard by the DPR.191 The DPR r e fu s e d to a cce p t the g ov ern m en t's a p p o in te e and resu b m itted t h e ir own ca n d id a te s f o r c o n s id e r a t i o n .
D ja k a rta , how ever, i n s is t e d th a t Ruslan re tu rn as g overn or to C en tra l Sumatra at the end o f December. There were s e v e r a l ir o n ie s in t h is s i t u a t i o n , p r i n c i p a l l y th a t the p o l i c y o f im posing D ja k a r ta 's own c h o ic e o f g ov ern or on C entral Sumatra was form u la ted and implemented by c a b in e ts headed by two prime m in is te r s o f Minangkabau o r i g i n , H atta and N a t s ir . M oreover, Hatta had lon g been a stro n g proponent o f autonomy f o r the r e g io n s , a d v o ca tin g c o n s id e r a b le d e c e n t r a liz a t io n o f a u t h o r it y .
I t is a ls o n o ta b le th a t t h is move was taken a g a in s t one o f the s t r o n g e s t bases o f r e p u b lic a n power throughout the s t r u g g le w ith the D utch, r a th e r than a g a in st a r e g io n w ith a r e c o r d o f c o lla b o r a t io n w ith the c o l o n i a l a u t h o r it y . I t i s . d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b lis h the r ig h t s and wrongs o f the c a s e . C le a r ly the l o c a l a u t h o r it ie s were a c t in g in an in t r a n s ig e n t manner v i s -i -v i s D ja k a rta .
In a d d it io n , th e re are h in ts th a t both the o p p o s i t io n to Nasrun and the r e fu s a l to a cce p t M u ljo h a rd jo may w e ll have been c o n fin e d to the Minangkabau elem ents o f the C en tral Sumatran DPR, and th ere was c l e a r l y c o n s id e r a b le te n s io n between them and th ose from o th e r r e g io n s re p re se n te d in the c o u n c il.
I t may w e ll have been th a t D jak arta f e l t th a t o n ly by a p p o in tin g a non-Minangkabau as the g ov ern or o f C en tral Sumatra c o u ld they m inim ize the fe a r s o f Djambi and Riau th a t the p ro v in ce would be co m p le te ly W est-Sumatra dom inated. At t h is time a ls o the c e n t r a l government was t r y in g to e s t a b lis h uniform p o l i c ie s f o r the whole o f In d o n e sia .
A ccep tan ce o f th ose p o l i c i e s e l s e where in the cou n try might have been th re a te n e d had a Minangkabau prime m in is te r and m in is t e r o f i n t e r i o r appeared to be y ie ld in g to Minangka bau o p p o s it io n . I t i s p o s s ib le to o th a t w ith in h is own Masjumi p a rty N a ts ir d id not wish to be c a l l e d p a r o c h ia l by appearin g to in d u lg e in fa v o r it is m towards p e o p le from h is own home a rea . N e v e r th e le s s , the la ck o f any r e p r e s e n t a t iv e l e g i s l a t i v e a u th o r ity in the p r o v in c e during the e a r ly 1950s was a co n s ta n t so u rce o f d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and r e c r im in a t io n .
This was at le a s t p a r t ly h e ld in check by the p o l i c i e s and a t t it u d e s o f the new g o v e r n o r , M u ljo h a rd jo , who, a l though a Java n ese, attem pted to reach accommodations w ith the l o c a l le a d e rs and s t r o n g ly re p re se n te d h is p r o v in c e 's econom ic g rie v a n ce s to Dj a k a r ta .
A lthough many o f the broad lin e s o f the independence movement in West Sumatra p a r a l le le d th ose on J a va , i t would be m isle a d in g to view the p a tte r n o f the r e v o lu t io n th e re as a mere copy o f the Javanese m odel.
In f a c t , n ot o n ly was th e re l i t t l e s i m i l a r i t y between the ev en ts in Sumatra and th o se in J a va , but in Sumatra i t s e l f even ts assumed autonomous and d iv e r s e forms w ith in d i f f e r e n t r e g io n s . There were a number o f f a c t o r s r e s p o n s ib le f o r t h i s .
Upon the base o f Suma t r a 's c o n s id e r a b le e th n ic and g e o g r a p h ic a l d i v e r s i t y the Japanese e s t a b lis h e d a d e c e n t r a liz e d a d m in is tr a tio n .
This s it u a t io n was s u s ta in e d throughout the r e v o lu t io n , e s p e c i a l l y d u rin g i t s f i r s t months, as a consequence o f the r e p u b lic a n c a p i t a l 's la c k o f c o n t r o l o v e r a c t io n s pursued by r e v o lu t io n a r y le a d e rs on th a t is la n d .
Thus, d e s p ite the f a c t th a t in 1945 Sumatra was d e sig n a te d as a s in g le p r o v in c e w ith in the new R e p u b lic o f In d o n e sia , w ith a g ov ern or r e s p o n s ib le f o r the w hole o f the is la n d , even ts in the d i f f e r e n t r e g io n s were in f a c t la r g e ly autonomous o f each o t h e r , and t h e ir d i r e c t i o n was determ ined p redom in an tly by r e g io n a l ra th e r than p r o v in c ia l f a c t o r s . While West Sum atra's t i e s w ith the c e n t r a l government were c l o s e r than w ith the p r o v in c ia l government in Medan, the Minangkabau saw the r e la t io n s h ip as one between equal p a rtn e rs in the s tr u g g le ra th e r than as one between su b o rd in a te and le a d e r .
This f e e l i n g in p a rt stemmed from the im portant r o le o f a la r g e number o f Minangkabau le a d e rs in the c e n t r a l r e p u b lic a n government and was sy m b olized by the p la c e o f a West Sumatran in the Sukarno/H atta duumvirate at the end o f the Indon esian s t a t e .
This was, how ever, o n ly p a rt o f the dual r o le which the Minang kabau p e o p le saw them selves p la y in g in the r e v o lu t io n .
The r e g io n o f West Sumatra i t s e l f they p e r c e iv e d as an area o f in t e g r a l im portance to the r e v o lu t io n a r y s t r u g g le , making a m ajor c o n t r ib u t io n to i t s f i n a l s u c c e s s .
R elevan t to t h is p e r c e p t io n was the s ta tu s o f B u k ittin g g i as the secon d c a p it a l o f In d o n e s ia , ready to become the se a t o f the repub l i c a n government sh ou ld J o g ja k a rta f a l l to the Dutch. During 1947 B u k itt in g g i d id , in f a c t , re-em erge as the c a p it a l o f Sumatra where Hatta d ir e c t e d the i s l a n d 's a f f a i r s ; and from December 1948, although B u k ittin g g i i t s e l f was o c c u p ie d by the D utch, the Emergency Government o f the r e p u b lic was e s t a b lis h e d in West Sumatra a f t e r the f a l l o f J o g ja k a rta and the ca p tu re o f most o f the top r e p u b lic a n le a d e r s h ip .
The r o le which the West Sumatrans saw them selves p la y in g a f t e r the Independence P rocla m a tion was a ls o c o n s is t e n t w ith the im portance o f the r e g io n as one o f the m ajor c e n te r s o f r e v o l t a g a in s t Dutch a u th o r i t y during the e a r l i e r p a r t o f the c e n tu r y .
The number o f Minangkabau le a d e r s e x i l e d by the Dutch as a r e s u lt o f a n t i c o l o n i a l movements th ere had p ro b a b ly combined w ith the g e n e r a lly a u t h o r it a r ia n nature o f Japa nese r u le on Sumatra to le a v e an apparent vacuum o f n a t i o n a l i s t le a d e r sh ip in West Sumatra during the o c c u p a tio n y e a r s , w ith the o ld -tim e ed u ca to r S j a f e i and the more dynamic younger C hatib Suleiman a p p a ren tly h o ld in g a v i r t u a l monopoly o f the top p o s it io n s during t h is p e r io d . But t h is s it u a t io n was an a r t i f i c i a l one and changed im m ediately a f t e r the c o n s t r a in t s imposed by the Japanese were removed.
From the l a t t e r months o f 1945 p o l i t i c a l l i f e in the r e g io n again assumed an a c t iv e c h a r a c t e r , w ith a d iv e r s e group o f men ta k in g up r o le s o f le a d e r s h ip . These in clu d e d p o l i t i c a l le a d e r s o f the 1920s and e a r ly 1930s who r e turned from t h e ir e x i l e in la t e 1945, prewar p a rty le a d e r s and minor o f f i c i a l s o f the c o l o n i a l a d m in is tr a tio n whose r o le had been minimal d u rin g the Japanese o c c u p a t io n , and a group o f younger men, n o ta b ly ju n io r m ilit a r y o f f i c e r s who had r e c e iv e d m ilit a r y t r a in in g in the Gyugun. A lthough S j a f e i 's r o le d im in ish ed in im portance a f t e r the e a r ly months o f the r e p u b lic , Chatib Suleiman co n tin u e d as one o f the most a c t iv e younger le a d e rs in the Minangkabau u n t il h is death at the b eg in n in g o f 1949.
A n o ta b le c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h is le a d e r s h ip group was th a t d e s p ite the apparent h e t e r o g e n e it y o f i t s p o l i t i c a l o r ie n t a t io n and e x p e r ie n c e , i t remained rem arkably s t a b le through out the r e v o lu t io n a r y y e a r s . A l though th ere was a broad range o f view s re p re se n te d w ith in i t th e re was a p p a ren tly a s u f f i c i e n t common denom inator o f a t t it u d e s on s o c i a l , e c o nomic and p o l i t i c a l m atters to perm it c o h e s io n and c o n t in u it y among i t s membership. This cannot be e x p la in e d m erely by in t e r n a l s o l i d a r i t y im posed by o u t s id e p r e s s u r e s , f o r t h is f a c t o r was a ls o o p e r a tiv e in o th e r p a r ts o f In d o n e sia w ith ou t r e s u lt in g in the same degree o f co h e s io n and c o n t in u it y . More l i k e l y t h is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c owed much to the e t h n ic hom ogeneity o f West Sumatra and the lo n g Minangkabau t r a d i t i o n o f b a l an cin g a p p a re n tly c o n f l i c t i n g b e l i e f s and id ea s among t h e ir members in a way th a t a v oid ed u p s e ttin g the c e n t r a l co h e s io n o f t h e ir s o c i e t y . r ie n t a t io n s and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to c o a le s c e th ese in t o any u n if ie d fr o n t f o r more than a few months in the fa c e o f a common d an ger, the r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s o f th ese groups were a b le to work to g e th e r e f f e c t i v e l y in the KNI and l a t e r the DPR, and none o f them was ev er ex clu d e d from r e p r e s e n t a t io n t h e r e .
Thus, w it h .v e r y few e x c e p t io n s , the men who sto o d at the head o f the West Sumatra KNI at the end o f 1945 r e ta in e d t h e ir le a d e r s h ip p o s i t io n s r ig h t through u n t il the t r a n s f e r o f s o v e r e ig n t y ; and although in t e r n a l te n s io n s d e v e lo p e d , th ese a p p a re n tly d id not r e s u lt in the deep p o l i t i c a l cle a v a g e s th a t were m a n ife ste d in o th e r p a rts o f Sumatra and Java. ^Although the w idespread o p p o s it io n to r e p u b lic a n p o l i c i e s o f compromise w ith the Dutch found t h e ir e x p r e s s io n through the V o lk s fr o n t o f 1946 and the March 3 A f f a i r o f 1947, n e it h e r o f th ese movements d e v e lo p e d in t o the armed c o n fr o n t a t io n s between op p osin g f o r c e s such as o c c u r r e d in s e v e r a l o th e r p a r ts o f the is la n d , and n e it h e r had any m ajor lo n g -te rm e f f e c t s in a lie n a t in g s e c t io n s o f the le a d e r s h ip . R ath er, b oth movements were ended through some d egree o f compromise and r e in t e g r a t io n o f the d i s s a t i s f i e d groups w ith in the r u lin g b o d ie s .
A p a r t ia l e x c e p tio n to t h is appears to have o c cu rre d w ith rega rd to the most c o n s e r v a tiv e s e c t io n o f the adat le a d e r s h ip , a group which saw i t s power b ein g undermined by attem pts at r e p r e s e n t a t iv e government w herein p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s groups would a ls o e x e r c is e a u th o r ity at the n e g e r i l e v e l .
In the l a s t y ea r o f the r e v o lu t io n , th en , some o f the adat le a d e r s were w i l l i n g to reach an accommodation w ith the Dutch in an attem pt to sh ore up t h e ir t r a d i t i o n a l power and p o s it io n s w ith in the s o c i e t y .
Here a g a in , how ever, the p e o p le in v o lv e d were few , and most o f them seem to have been a b le to make t h e ir peace w ith the r e p u b lic as soon as i t became c le a r th a t the Dutch e f f o r t s would f a i l .
The dynamic c h a r a c te r o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e in West Sumatra d u rin g the r e v o lu t io n owed much to the f a c t th a t between 1945 and the end o f 1948 most o f the r e g io n s to o d o u t s id e the area o f s tro n g Dutch p r e s s u r e . (The o n ly c lo s e p a r a l l e l to t h is s it u a t io n was th a t o b ta in in g in A tje h , which m aintained i t s independence from Dutch c o n t r o l throughout the r e v o l u t i o n .)
The p o l i t i c a l le a d e r s thus had a f r e e hand to experim ent w ith a d m in is tr a tiv e and l e g i s l a t i v e forms and d e v e lo p system s o f g o v ernment which they f e l t were a ttu n ed to Minangkabau s o c i e t y .
In t h is p r o c e s s they grew from a r e l a t i v e l y in e x p e r ie n c e d group o f o f f i c i a l s in to a body w ith a h igh degree o f p o l i t i c a l s e l f -c o n s c i o u s n e s s , ta k in g f o r gran ted t h e ir a b i l i t y to e x e r c is e an e f f e c t i v e governm ental c o n t r o l ov er the a f f a i r s o f t h e ir r e g io n .
One o f the m ajor themes in the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d was the co n tin u in g e f f o r t to rea ch a more r e p r e s e n t a t iv e form o f government w ith in the r e g io n .
The aim was in p a rt to end the com p lete dom ination o f l o c a l a f f a i r s by the t r a d i t i o n a l penghulu group and to put them in to the hands o f a w id er spectrum o f le a d e r s .
As e a r ly as 1946 e l e c t i o n s f o r r e p r e s e n t a t iv e c o u n c ils a t the n e g e r i l e v e l were h e ld to a ccom p lish t h i s .
E s s e n t ia l to th ese co n ce p ts was the id ea o f autonomy and s e l fs u f f i c i e n c y at each l e v e l o f governm ent, and f o r t h is reason th e re were c o n s id e r a b le e f f o r t s during the n ext two y ea rs to make the v i l l a g e ad m in is t r a t io n s la r g e enough and to t r a in t h e i r o f f i c i a l s s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r th ese u n its to r e t a in a c o n s id e r a b le d egree o f independence from the h ig h e r l e v e l s o f the a d m in is t r a tio n .
I t was f o r t h is rea son to o th a t the C en tra l Sumatran KNI moved so r a p id ly in 1948 to implement the d e c e n t r a liz a t io n law p assed by the J o g ja k a rta government w ith rega rd to autonomous l e v e l s o f a d m in is tr a tio n at the p r o v i n c i a l , kabupaten and w ila ja h l e v e l s .
And i t is n o ta b le th a t in com batting the Dutch attem pts to s e t up a Minangkabau s t a t e in e a r ly 1949, the re p u b lica n le a d e r s in West Sumatra, w h ile la y in g s t r e s s on t h e ir lo y a lt y to the r e p u b lic , ad v o ca te d an autonomous sta tu s f o r the Minangkabau r e g io n w ith in the R ep u b lic o f In d on esia ra th e r than i t s com plete and u n q u a lifie d i n c o r p o r a t io n .
At the p r o v in c ia l l e v e l the d i v i s i o n o f Sumatra in t o th re e se p a ra te p r o v in c e s in 1948 m erely acknowledged the f a i l u r e o f e f f o r t s to c r e a te a s in g le p r o v in c e on the is la n d and r a t i f i e d the broad lin e s o f the s it u a t io n which had e x is t e d th e re s in c e 1945. However, the g rou p ing o f the th re e r e s id e n c ie s o f West Sumatra, Riau and Djambi in t o the p r o v in c e o f C en tral Sumatra h e ld the d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y th a t the more co h e s iv e 'p o l i t i c a l le a d e r s h ip and e t h n ic hom ogeneity o f West Sumatra would le a d to i t s dom inating the new p r o v in c e .
The a c t io n s o f the c e n t r a l government in 1950-51 appeared to n e gate much o f the p ro g re s s which had been a ch ie v e d in West Sumatra during the r e v o lu t io n a r y y ea rs towards autonomy in l o c a l a f f a i r s and some form o f r e p r e s e n t a t iv e governm ent.
I t must have appeared to many o f the Minangkabau th a t t h e ir p o s i t i o n in the In don esian s t a t e had now n ot m erely r e v e r te d to th a t o f 1945 but in some ways c l o s e l y resem bled th a t o f the l a s t y ea r o f Dutch r u l e .
In 1950 Sumatra was d iv id e d m i l i t a r i l y in t o two r e g io n s w ith h ead qu arters r e s p e c t iv e ly at Medan and Palembang and the c i v i l i a n government o f the p ro v in ce o f C en tra l Suma t r a was removed from the hands o f l o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s to th ose o f a p p oin te e s o f the I n t e r io r M in is try in D ja k a rta .
The l o y a l t y o f West Sumatra t o the re p u b lic a n government th rou gh out the r e v o lu t io n had c l e a r l y been stre n g th e n e d by the p re se n ce o f so many Minangkabau in i t s c e n t r a l le a d e r s h ip .
However, the men whom the West Sumatrans had rega rd ed as t h e ir r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s on Java c l e a r l y d id n ot view t h e ir r e g io n o f o r i g i n as having cla im s on t h e i r l o y a l t y th a t co u ld be p e rm itte d to in flu e n c e t h e ir approach to n a tio n a l p o l i c ie s a r r iv e d at in D ja k a rta . I t i s p o s s ib le th a t they w ere, in f a c t , w i l l i n g to move the more r e s o l u t e l y a g a in s t West Sumatra because o f t h e ir c e r t a in t y o f i t s adherence to the r e p u b lic and becau se they w ished to s e t an example f o r o th e r r e g io n s on whom they co u ld not so c o m p le te ly r e l y .
The im portant r o le which the Minangkabau in West Sumatra saw them selves p la y in g in the s t r u g g le w ith the Dutch was never re c o g n iz e d by the c e n t r a l government as having such m ajor re le v a n ce t o the outcome o f the r e v o lu t io n a r y s t r u g g le as to w arrant t h e ir b e in g p e rm itte d a degree o f autonomy which i f gra n ted to o th e r r e g io n s might th re a te n the co h e s io n o f the new u n ita ry s t a t e .
